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In deciding between choices in poverty programs,  the chief
criteria should be administrative  and political  feasibility,  how
easy  it is to target  the  program's  benefits  to the poor,  whether  the
program  addresses  the  real  problem,  and,  when  collateral  effects
are weighed,  whether  the net effect is to reduce  poverty.
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Grosh addresses  the issue of how to choose  *  Potentidlfor targeting  the  poor. Will the
among  discreet  poverty  intervendons  such as  program  reach  significant  numbers  of the poor?
food stamp  programs,  public works,  or small  How much leakage  of benefits  will there be to
enterprise  credit schemes  where  little formal  the nonpoor?
policy modeling  is done prior to decisionmaking.
* Tailoring  the solution  to the  problem.  The
The minimum  criteria  on which to judge the  program  cho'ce should  address  the real problem.
relative  merits of poverty  programs,  says Grosh,  Where  the poor have suffered  a loss of real
are five:  wages  rather  than a loss of jobs, for example,
transfers  to the working  poor may be more
* Adtninistralivefeasibility.  This depends  on  relevant  than  crnating  jobs. This criterion  may
the detailed  design of the program,  the level of  seem obvious,  but many  proposals  seem  to
resources  available  for administration,  and the  ignore  it.
degree  of imperfection  that can be tolerated.
rosh illustrates  her main points by applying
* Politicalfeasibility. This depends  on how  these  criteria  to a range of poverty  programs
the program  is promoted  to the public,  how  commonly  used in Latin America.  General
coalitions  oA  supporters  or detractors  are built,  subsidies  of food prices,  for example,  are admin-
and the relative  power of beneficiaries,  suppliers,  istratively  and politically  feasible  and lower food
and administrators.  costs to the consumer,  but they are difficult  to
target to the poor and they  may distort  the
l  Collateral  effects  on the  poverty strategy.  economy,  harming  growth.  Food stamps  are easy
How will a safety  net program  affect, for ex-  to target to the poor, are fairly difficult  to
ample, the participants' labor  supply,  participa-  administer,  depending  on program  design,  but
tion in other programs,  and receipt  of private  depending  on program  design, may encourage
interhousehoid  transfers,  and how will those  the use of schools and primary  health care. But
changes  affect markets  and govemment  fi-  there is controversy  about  whether  they encour-
nances? What will  be the net effect on poverty  age  dependency  and diminish  the work  ethic.
reduction?
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I.  Introduction
This paper addresses the  issue of  how to  choose among discrete poverty
interventions  such as food stamps programs, public works, or small-enterprise  credit schemes.
The aim of this paper is not to  move forward the science of policy modeling, but to move
forward the art of program  selection  when, for any of a variety or reasons, little  policy modeling
will be done prior to decision making.  Without a clear framework for discussion (such as
rigorous cost-effectiveness  or cost-benefit  analysis  would  provide),  debates  about  program choice
often become endless, circular polemics mired in a morass of conflicting  goals, criteria, and
ideology. A lack of data often forces reliance on impressionistic  and conflicting  information  on
predicted  or real program  outcomes, which further confuses  discussions. The paper proposes  a
set of criteria that can help avoid that morass and to think through program choices in an
organized way.  It then reviews the available evidence from Latin American mxperience  with
several common  types of poverty alleviation  programs.  The criteria proposed cover the main
dimensions  of cost-effectiveness  analysis, although  often the absence  of quantitative  information
may render the considerations  qualitative  and subjective.
T-he  paper arises from having been present at the moment when policymakers,
faced with the results of the economic  depressions  and macroeconomic  adjustment  programs of
the last few years, have asked, "What new welfare  program do we need?" In my experience  in
observing and analyzing  these decisions, full-fledged  cost-effectiveness  analysis of alternative
poverty interventions  is rarely done before program choices  are made. These choices often  take
place after only a few weeks of  exploration of options.  Furthermore, data to  use in that
exploration are scarce and the level of analysis of what data do exist is usually rudimentary.
Hence the need for ways of ordering our thoughts in the absence of a well-specified  analytical
framework.
In contrast  to the resources  available,  the requirements  for good cost-effectiveness
analysis are formidable. Some of the costs, such as those of the direct program benefits and
administration,  can be fairly easily estimated  from program budgets. But determining  the gross
distribution  of benefits between  the poor and the non-poor  requires household  welfare data.  To
estimate  the net distribution  of benefits  (discounting  for, inter  alia, costs to recipients  of program
part:cipation,  changes  in labor supply, or changes  in private inter-household  transfers stemming
from  the  introduction of  the prograrn)'  requires both household data and  some  analytic
'See Dominique  van der Walle "Whether  to Target -- and How" Outreach  Number 6 (Wasilington,
D.C.:  World Bank Country Economics Department, December 1992) and Indermit Gill, Emmanuel
Jimenez and Zamarak Shalizi "Targeting  Consumer  Subsidies  for Poverty Alleviation: A Survey and a
Primer of Basic  Theory" unpublished  (Washington,  D.C.:  World Bank  Country Economics  Department,
December 1990),  pg.  10 and pp. 24-28.2
sophistic2tion. While these issues are usually handled in a partial equilibrium framework, 2
others (such as the effect of labor supply on the product markets from which labor might be
withdrawn as a result of the postulated  program, or the effects of the financing mechanism  on
the markets and incomes)  require general equilibrium  analysis, 3 which is even more demanding.
In addition to the strictly economic  aspects  in cost-effectiveness  analysis, issues
of administrative  and political feasibility must be assessed.  In part, these can be influenced
through program design, reflected in its costs, and therefore addressed in the assessment  of its
cost-effectiveness. For example, adequate  resources for salaries, equipment,  sup jiies, transport
and comnmunications  can improve the administrative  feasibility of even a large or  complex
program. Political  feasibility  may be improved  through direct expenditures  for public relations, 4
or through design options that aller" a certain  amount  of leakage  to the non-poor' or that proviae
2  'hree examples  illustrate  the approach: John Newman,  Steen  Jorgensen,  and Menno  Pradhan "How
Did Workers Benefit?"  in Steen Jorgensen, Margaret  Grosh and Mark Schacter, eds., Bolivia's Answer
to Poverty, Economic Crisis, and Adjustment:  The Emergency  Social Fund (Washington  D.C.:  The
WNorld  Bank, pg. 55-64 estimate  the foregone  earnings  of participants  in the ESF.  A review of the labor
suipply  effects of the United States' Aid to Families with Dependent  Children is found in Robert Moffitt
"Incentive  Effects of the U.S. Welfare System: A Review"  Journal of Economic  Literature Vol. XXX
(March 1992), pp. 1-61.  Donald Cox and Emmanuel  Jimenez, "Social Security and Private Transfers
in Developing  Countries: The Case of Peru" 7he World  Bank Economic  Review, Vol. 6 (January 1992),
pp.  155-170 calculate  the magnitude  of changes in private interhousehold  transfers resulting from the
Peruvian social security system.
3For example,  the effect of choices  about  where to obtain  subsidized  commodities  and how to finance
food subsidy programs are modeled  using a general equilibrium  approach by Hans P. Binswanger  and
Jaime B. Quizon "Distributional  Consequences  of Alternative  Food Policies in India" in Per Pinstrup-
Andersen, ed. Food Subsidies  in Developing Countries  (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins  Press, 1988)  pg. 85.
Domingo  Cavallo  and Yair Mund'ak "Agriculture  and Economic  Growth  in an Open  Economy: The Case
of Argentina" Research  Report 36 (Washington,  D.C.:  International  Food Policy Research Institute,
December 1982)  use a general equilibrium  framework  to investigate  how alternate subsidy  policies  affect
agricultural  investment  and growth. The fiscal and foreign  trade effects  of alternate  food subsidy  schemes
are modeled in Nora Lustig and Lance Taylor "Mexican  Food Consumption  Policies in a Structuralist
CGE Model" in Lance Taylor, ed. Socially  Relevant Policy  Analysis (Cambridge:  MIT Press, 1990)
pp. 71-84.
4For example, the Bolivian  Emergency  Social Fund conducted  a public awareness  campaign  when it
found its beneficiaries  unfamiliar  with its program. See Margaret  E. Grosh, From  Platitudes  to Practice:
Targeting  Social Programs  in Latin America (World  Bank Report  No. 10720-LAC,  1992)  Volume  1, pg.
32.
SThe Chilean Programa Nacional de Alimentacion  Complementaria  (PNAC), for example, gives
rations  to all children who  use public  health centers, with larger rations  going to those who are considered
to be at high risk of malnutr.tion.  Half of tl'e products distributed  go to the 17 percent of the children
at risk. Thus the program is to a degree targeted, while maintaining  the political support of a univer,al
program  For further discussion  see Grosh "Platitudes  to Practice"  pg. 122.3
markets for products of influential groups.'  But other aspects of administrative  and political
feasibility  are not easy to capture this way. The Intangibles  of work culture, stigma, and power
relations are hard to convert into a monetary measure.
This paper focusses  narrowly  on how to choose  among  programs often suggested
as part of the safety  net. It takes as given  that a complete  poverty  reduction  strategy entails  much
more -- a thorough, permanent  structuring  of policies and investments  in ways that will allow  the
poor and their children to earn higher wages  throughout  their productive  lives. The 1990  World
Development  Report, 7 for example,  concludes  that a complete  poverty  reduction  strategy  requires
two lines of attack to reduce poverty in the long run, while a third complementary  line of action
may be taken to support the poor who will remain:
(i)  Promote eMcient,  labor-initensive  growth.  This will result in employment  and
earnings opportunities  based on labor, which is the poor's most abunidant  asset.  Tax,
trade, exchange  rate, monetary  and labor policies  will  be important  points of intervention.
Investment in basic infrastructure and social and political institutions will also be
required.
(ii)  Provide basic social services to the poor.  Primary health care, family planning,
nutrition and primary education should be provided to the poor.  These basic social
services  are human  capital investments  that help the poor to become  productive  workers.
They are also humanitarian  actions  that provide a minimum  standard  of welfare even for
those with low money incomes.
(iii) Tar;eted  transfers  and social safety nets.  Even where the two-part strategy for
long-run poverty alleviation  have been fully implemented,  some poverty will remain.
The sick, the old and those in the poorest regions are unlikely to be  able to  take
advantage  of adequate  earnings  opportunities. Others  will suffer  from temporary  setbacks
owing to seasonal variations in income, loss of the family breadwinner or famine or to
macroeconomic  shocks. And while  the long-run  measures  take effect, some shorter term
relief may be deemed desirable.
The proposed crite-  for choosing among  transfer or safety nets programs are
set out in Part II of the paper.  In Part III, several  of the most common  program alternatives  are
sized up in terms of the criteria, using recent examples  of program  experience  in Latin America.
In Part IV, the proposed  criteria are applied  to the situation  that wds faced in Bolivia  in 1986  and
in Jamaica in 1988 to illustrate  how the criteria accomodate  country-specfic  details and to see
whether the criteria support the (generally  successful)  strategies  that were chosen in each case.
In Part V, conclusions  are drawn.
6For exa! dle,  Nicole Ballenger and Courtney Harold "Revising Surplus Food Programs After
Surpluses:  The Temporary Emergency Food Assistance Program and its Role in the District of
Columbia" Discussion Paper  No.  FAP91-01 (Washington, D.C.:  National Center for  Food and
Agricultural Policy Resources for the Future, March 1991) pg. 2 illustrate the origin of tde TEFAP
program in U.S. farm commodity  surpluses.
'World Bank World  Development  Report 1990 (Oxford University  Press, 1990), pg. 3.4
II.  Proposed  Criteria for Program Choice
Proposed  Criteria  for Choosing  a Program. A minimum  set of criteria on which
to judge the relative merits of poverty programs is the following:
*  Administrativa  feasibility
*  Political feasibility
*  Collateral effects on elements  (i) and (ii) of the poverty  strategy
*  Targeting
*  Tailoring  the solution  to the problem
It is assumed  that each  program  option  would  be operated in a reasonably  efficient
manner. The choice referred to is not between  a good school lunch  program and a bad one (an
easy choice) but between, for example,  a good school lunch program and a good Social Fund.
It is also assumed  that the program  is required to have an ir.i)act  on the poor noticieable  to them
during a government's  terms of office -- from one to five yeart.'
Administrative feasibility.  A program must pass some minimum level of
administrative  feasibility  before  it can be viable.  After that, there are degrees of administrative
feasibility  depending  on the level of imperfections  that can be tolerated and the extra resources
that are available  to bolster  administrative  capacity. The issue  of administrative  feasibility  affects
both the choice between different kinds of programs and the detailed design of the program
selected.
Political feasibility. A program must also possess a minimum  level of political
feasibility  if it is to be viable.  After that there are degrees  of feasibility  depending  on program
design and country context issues such as the relative power of beneficiaries, suppliers and
administrators,  how the program is promoted to the public and how coalitions  of supporters  or
detractors are built.
Collateral Effects.  In adopting a safety net program, consideration  should be
given  to the program's possible  collateral  effects  such as changes  in the participants' labor  supply,
participation  in other programs, or receipt  of private inter-household  transfers, and the effects of
these changes  on markets and government  finances. These  may be positive, negative,  or neutral
with respect to the overall poverty  reduction strategy.
Targeting.  Poverty programs are obviously  meant to reach the poor.  Leakage
of benefits to the non-poor  reduces the effectiveness  of the program because  funds are used on
those who are not in need. Furthermore,  the peogram  must be able to reach significant  numbers
of the poor to avoid the problem of undercoverage.  If it is incapable  of doing so, the program
will be ineffective.
8If this constraint were to be relaxed, a sixth criterion might be added to the list  --  the time profile
of benefits.5
Tailoring the Solution to the Problem.  The program choice  should reflect the
problems faced in the particular country  and time.  For example, where the poor have suffered
a loss of real wages rather th.n a  loss of jobs, transfers to the working poor may be more
relevant that job  creation.  While this criterion seems almost too obvious to  include, initial
proposals of what to do about  poverty programs seem to ignore it often enough that I maintain
it on the list.
It we hlad  fully quantitative  information  about  program results on tGese  criteria,
we could do full cost-effectiveness  simulations. We would  start from a fixed program  budget  and
a known  distribution  of welfare. From the budget  we would deduct administrative  costs and any
monetary costs necessary  to gain political feasibility  (we would rule out of the choice set those
programs for which reasonable  program expenditures  couldn't provide minimal administrative
or political feasibility  or introduce a constraint  function on political feasibility  as do de Janvry
aad Sadoulet 9 in their work on the political feasibility of alternate macroeccnomic  adjustment
packages). Then we would simulate  a new welfare distribution  taking into account ihe level of
program benefits  possible given the remaining  budget, the targeting  outcomes  achieved,  and the
direction and magnitude  of collateral  effects. The extent or depth of poverty could be measured
by an index  of poverty such as provided  in the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke  family  of measures. The
best program option would be that which, for a given budget, produced the lowest poverty
measure.
In the absence  of sufficient  quantitative  information  to carry out the full program
simulation, we can use the proposed criteria to  marshal, what evidence or guestimates are
available in an organized fashion.  However, without the simulation which would implicitly
provide a weighting between  the different criteria, we are left without a firm way of ordering
preferences. I therefore suggest  that program  options first have to pass a rough pass/fail  test on
each criteria.  This will eliminate  those that are unlikely, whatever the configuration  of other
advantages, to pass muster in the end.  For example, some programs might be infeasible  on
political or administrative  grounds even if considerable  ingenuity  and expense  went into trying
to make them so.  These could be ruled out.  Also those programs with very large negative
collateral  effects might be excluded  on the grounds tuat offsetting  advantages  would have to be
very large or that compli-ited compensatory  arrangements  that are unlikely to materialize  would
be needed to make them desirable.  Very poorly targeted programs (which either include big
portions of non-poor or fail badly in reaching the poor) might also be omitted.  Programs  that
do not address the problems at hand in fairly direct manner could likewise be excluded.  In
comparing  among programs that pass these first rough sieves of feasibility, I can only suggest
reliance  on professional  judgment in qualitatively  assessing  the tradeoffs among  options.
III.  A Review of Program  Experience
When it is not possible to do full cost-effectiveness  evaluations  prior to making
program recommendations,  a review of recent Latin American  program experience  can help us
9Alain de  Janvry,  Andre Fargeix and  Elisabeth Sadoulet "Economic, Welfare, and  Political
Consequences  of Stabilization  Policies:  A General Equilibrium  Approach" unpublished  (University  of
California  at Berkeley Department  of Agricultural  and Resource  Economics,  October 1989.6
to infer how tie proposed  program  options  might iare.  Prudent adjustments  will, of course, have
to be made in those inferences  for how the program proposals  or context  differ from the country
experiences  reviewed.
The following  review of program experience  abstracts from several issues that
will affect the impact  of transfer programs  generally  -- offsetting  declines in private  transfers, the
effects of the taxes which support the program, and the second round effects of the respending
of the income transferred. Rather, the effect of thJse issues is sketched  briefly here.
Thb net benefits of public t&.  i(^r  schemes will be influenced  by how private
transfers may change  as a response  to them.  Cox and Jimenez, for example,  simulate  the effect
of social security receipt on private transfers in Peru.  Average social security payments  were
about 30 intis,'° and the average amount by which social security was estimated to reduce
transfers was 10 intis," so that the net benefits of tiie social security payments were about a
third lower than gross benefits.  If this result is widely applicable to other countries and
progranis, then any estimate  of the cost-effectiveness  of a government  transfer programs  that does
not  make allowance for changes in private inter-househo 1d  transfers will overestimnate  the
program's irnnact.
We do not yet have evidence as to whether the respr,nse of private transfers
d;ffers depending  on the form in which the transfer is received -- i.e. whether in cash, in kind,
or in reduced prices for commoditic or services.  Indeed, we do not have evidence  for any of
the specific programs reviewed  in this section  on howv  interhousehold  transfers were influenced
by the programs. Lacking empirical  evidence  on the issue, we will assume here that behavioral
responses  do not differ by the form of transfer. Thus we can abstract  from the issue  of how large
offsetting  declines in private transfers might be (which addresses whether  governments  should
provide transfers) and can go forward with our choice among programs (which addresses  how
government  should provide transfers).
The net benefits of public transfer scheries will also be influenced  by how they
are financed.  Binswanger  and Quizon, for exarnple model th2 effect for several food policy
options in India.  When assuming  that the hypothetical  programs are financed through foreign
aid, the improvement  in real per capita income  of the poorest rural quartile is 0.86 perceir!  for
urban ration shops, 5.2 percent for untargeted subsidies, and 17.6 percent for food stamps.
Assuming that the same programs are  financed through a  domestic excise tax  results in
improvements  in incomes  of 0.3 percent, 4.3 percent, and 16 percent, respectively.''  Thus the
modeling of the financing mechanism  reduces benefits to these groups from two-thirds to one
tenth of the level predicted when the tax effects are not considered.
'"Cox and Jimenez, "Soci.l Security and Private Transfers in Developing  Countries: The Case of
Peru"  p. 161.
"Cox and Jimenez, pg. 167.
'2Binswanger  and Quizon, "Consequences  of Alternative  Food Policies  in India"  Table 22.1, pp. 306-
309.7
In the review presented here, I  abstract from the issue of how any of the
programs would  be financed. The impliVit  assumption  is that the question  is not whether  or how
to raise revenue anu spend it for a poverty  prigram, but having  decided that a certain  amount  of
existing revenue should be spent on a poverty program, which kind of poverty program should
it be?  Again, I concentrate  not on whether  to have a program, but on how.
A third indirect  effect of transfer prograns is that the recipients  of the transfers
will spend them.  This in turn may improve  the welfare of those who supply the products they
purchase. It is such an effect that accounts  for the increase (albeit  small) in the welfare of thd
rural poor when urban ra'ion shops directly benefitting  on:y nrban residents were modeled by
Binswanger  and Quizon in the above example. A sccond exam  )le comes from an evaluation  of
the employment  effects of the Bolivian Emergency  Social Fund.  A general equilibriumn  model
estimated  that of the total employment  effect of ESF expenditures,  53 percent was due to indirect
effects and only 47 percent to direct effects' 3 (e.g. a multiplier  effect of 1.1).
I  abstract from the respending effects of 11rogram  transfers in the following
review, again in order to focus more study or direct program etffects.
Finally, I should  clarify here that although  several of the programs reviewed  use
food as a transfer mechanism,  it is the implicit income  transfer that is studied  here, rather than
the extent to which that income  improves  nutrition. Although it is often the intent that transfers
will be used in  improve nutrition, the empirical evidence as to the extent of this effect is
mixed." 4 But since it is the pre- and post-transfer income-based  poverty index that is the
outcome measure suggested to compare programs, it is the income effect of the transfers that
matter here,  whether they be embodied in food or  is some other vehicle.  Without more
preamble, let me move to the program review.
General Food Price Subsidies
General food price subsidies  have been used in niany countries over the years.
The subsidies  that have been studied  the most are those in Mexico, Brazil and Argentina,  though
there are less widely ^irculated  studies for othet ., such as Jamaica and Venezuela.'" In most
'3Unidad  de Analisis de Polfticas  Econ6micas  "Modelo  para Medir el Impacto Macroec6nomico  de
los Proyectos  del Fondo Social de Emergencia"  unpublished  paper prepared  for dhe  Bolivian  Emergency
Social Fund, La Paz, Bolivia, January 1988, pg. 13.
'4  For a review, see Je:.  R. Behrman  "The  Action  of Human  Resources  and Poverty on One Another:
What We Have Yet to Learn" Living  Standard  Measurement  Study Working  Paper No.74 (Washington,
D.C.; World Bank, October 1990)  pp.80-86.
" 5For Mexico, see Nora Lustig "Fiscal Cost and Welfare Effects  of the Maize Subsidy in Mexico"
in Per Pinstrup-Andersen,  ed. Food Subsidies  in Developing  Countries  (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins  Press,
1988)  pp. 277-288  and Nora Lustig "Food  Subsidy  Programs  in Mexico" Working  Paper 3 (Washington:
International  Food Policy Research Institute, January 1986).  For Brazil, see Geraldo M. Calegar and
CT.  Edward Schuh "The Brazilian  Wheat Policy: Its Costs, Benefits  and Effects on Food Consumption"
Research Report 66 (Washington:  International Food Policy Research Institute, May 1988).  For8
Table 1: Summary  of Program  Assessments
Food
General Food  Commodities  |  Micro-enterpris
Price Subsidies  Food Stamps  through Clinics  School Feeding  Social Funds  Credit
Administrative  usually good  medium to high  medium to high  medium  agility may require  demanding,
Feasibillty  requirements  roquirements  requirements  exceptions to  usually
depending  ,n  depending on  procurmment and  successful only
design  design  civil cervice  on very small
standards  scale
litical  excellent  controversy  usua2y good,  excelPent  popular with  good
easibility  over dependency,  occational  people;  may have
effect on work  objections to  opponents in
ethic  paternalinm  bureaucrmcy
ollateral  distorts  depending on  increases use of  encourage  can provide basic  complements
ffects  economy - design, may  preventive health  school  infrastructure;  growth
deleteriows to  encourage use of  care  attendance and  and/or social
growth  primary  health  learning  services
care or whools
'argeting  poor  good  good  varicble - from  not weU measured  excellent





-ailoring  lowers food  reaches working  provides  lowers implicit  provides  improves lot of
olution to  cost to net  poor and/or  pregnant/lactati,ig  cost of  temporary,  full-  the informal
roblem  purchasers  vulnerable groups  women and  schooling  time work to  sector %vjocj
young children  young male heads  grow during hare
synergy of health  of household  times
care/health
education/income
___  _ _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  I  _  __transfer
cases, the bulk of the subsidy  value has gone to staple items that are a larger share of the food
basket for the poor than for the non-poor.  In Latin America, their contribution  to the pooi's
Argentina, see Yair Mundlak, Domingo Cavalho ai.  Roberto Domenech "Agriculture and Economic
Growth in Argentina, 1913-84"  Research Report 76 (Washington: International  Food Policy Research
Institute, November 1989)  and Domingo  Cavalho  and Yair Mundlak "Agriculture  and Economic  Growth
in an Open Economy: The Case of Argentina"  Research Report 36 (Washington,  D.C.:  International
Food Policy  Research  Institute, December 1982). For Jamaica, information  is taken from internal  Worid
Bank  sources and Statistical  Institute  of Jamaica  (STATIN)  and World  Bank "Preliminary  Report: Living
Conditions  Survey, Jamaica" Kingston,  Jamaica, October 1988.  For Venezuela,  information  is taken
from internal  World Bank sources.9
welfare  has ranged  from less than 5 percent  of the poorest quirntile's  food expenditures  in Jamaica
in 1988  to more than 25 percent of the poorest quintile's  food expenditures  in Mexico  in 1977.16
Administrative  Feasibility. General food price subsidies  can be administered  in
a variety of forms. 27 Governments  can import  the .tems through monopoly  trading agents  at one
price and sell to the distribution  chain at a lower price, as was the case in Jamaica. If the good
is locally  produced,  the price can be regulated, leaving  the cost to be borne as an implicit  tax on
the producers.  Alternately, governments can purchase locally grown crops through a  state
commodity  boa-d and sell at a lower price, as done in Mexico."' The common use of food
subsidies" indicates  that their admini:trative  feasibility  is generally  good.
Political Feasibility.  Low food prices can be very popular politically.  Net
consumers are always happy to Aeceive  their benefits. As the beneficiaries  ctn range from the
lion's share of the urban population to the lion's share of the whole population depending  on
which commodities  are subsidized,  the benefits  can be very widespread  indeed. And they usually
include the politically  vocal urban and middle-class  groups.
(ollateraL  Eff.cts.  General food price'  subsidies  can distort the free market and
may work against  the measu  res aimed at improving  long-term  growth in the economny,  especially
in agriculture.'  Implicit consumer  food subsidies  maintained  through artificially low producer
prices can  reduce  farm production  and incomes. Reducing  consumer  prices %  ;ll increase  demand,
which is often met tiirough  imports  which require scarce foreign exchange. tf a large portion of
the price subsidy is provided implicitly  through an overvalued exchange  rate, then incentives  in
the economy  in general are distorted. How severe  these drawbacks  are will depend  on how large
the subsides are, on how they are financed and or, the effects  of a series of macroeconomic  and
'6STATIN  and World  Bank, Liviing  Conditions  Survey, pg. 62 and Lustig, Food Subsidy  Programs,
pg 6.
" 7See discussions  in Malcolm Bale, "Agricultural  Trade and Food Policy: The Experience  of Five
Developing Countries" WorlP Bank Staff Working Paper No. 724 (Washington  D.C.: World Bank,
March 1985) pp. 10-15 and Alberto Valdes, "Explicit  versus Implicit Food Subsidies: Distribution  of
Costs" in Per Pinstrup-Andersen,  ed. Food Subsidies  in Developing  Coun.ries  (Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins
Press, 1988)  pg. 85.
'8Lustig, "Fiscal Cost and Welfare Effects" pg.278.
" 9Bale, "Agriculture  Trade and Food Policy" pg. 13.
2 ' See  Per  Pinstrup-Andersen "The  Social and  Economic Effects of  Consumer-Oriented  Food
Subsidies:  A Summary of  Current Evidence" in  Per  Pinstrup-Andersen, ed.  Food Subsidies in
Developing Countries (Baltimore:  Johns  Hopkins Press,  1988) pp.  3-20,  Grant  M.  Scobie
"Macroeconomic and Trade Implications of  Consumer-Oriented  Food Subsidies" in  Per  Pinstrup-
Andersen, ed. Food Subsidies  in DeveloDing  Countries  (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins  Press, 19R8)  pp. 49-
76, and Bale "Agricultural  Trade and Food Policy".10
agricultural  policies.  Calegar and Schuh's 2'  ana!ysis of Brazilian wheat price subsidies, for
example,  estimates  that the economic  inefficiencies  (deadweight  losses) induced  by the program
were worth about 15 percent of its cost.
Tarzeting.  Geuieral  f;od price subsidies  tend to benefit the rich .nore than the
poor in  absolute terms but not in relative terms.'  In the case of Jamaica's general food
subsidies  (that now have been eliminated),  the subsidized  foods were well chosen, in the sense
that  the subsidized  staples  constituted  a larger share of the tood budgets of tde poor (3.7 percent)
than of thL rich (1.1 percent).'  The rich, t;owever, spent much more in absolute terms than
the poor did, so that only 14 percent of the transfer benefits  accrued to the poorest quintile  of the
population  and 26 percent to the richest  (see Table 2).  I'his same pattern can be observed in the
other countries for which incidence  information  is available.
The incidence  of food price subsidies  will be determined  by the income  and price
elasticities  cf the commodity  that is subsidized. If commodities  with negative  income  elasticities
can be found, then the incidence of the overall subsidy will be progressive. 2'  But there are
apparently  few examples of  food commodities  with these characteristics (and that are also
important  in the food basket and have production  patterns that lead to easy administration  of
subsidies). Governments  have typically subsidized  commodities  with low but positive income
elasticities,  which has led to the incidence  patterns observed above.
" 2Calegar  and Schuh, "The Brazilian  Wheat Policy" pg. 10.
'--Whether  this effect is classified as progressive or regressive  varies by the definitions of the terms
used.  If progressivity is defined as meaning an action that equalizes the welfare distribution then
(abstracting  from financing issues) this distribution of benefits is progressive.  A more demanding
definition  of progressivity  requires that the absolute  benefit be larger for the poor than the rich.  By this
definition,  the distribution  of benefits is regressive.
23STATIN  and World Bank, Living Conditions  Survey, pg. 62.
24A negative  income  elasticity means  that if the household's income  goes up, the amount  spent on the
commodities  will  go down. This is rare. For most staples,  the share of the total budget  spent on the item
will decline,  but the absLlute  amount  spent will rise with income. It is also possible  for the subsidization
of commodities  with high own- and cross-price  elasticities  for the poor but with low own- and cross-price
elasticities  for the rich to resutl in progressive incidence.  Many staples also show high own-price
elasticities  for the poor but low own-price  elasticiti-6  for the rich and there is some evidence  of similar
patterns  in cross-price  elasticities. Of course, the same features of importance  in the poor's food basket
and sutiable  production patterns must still obtain.  For a siniple primer on these issues see Chapter 7
"Purchasing  Power:  Income and the Price of  Food" in Philips Foster 7he World Food Problem.-
Tackling  the Causes  of Undernutrition  in the 7hird World (Boulder:  Lynne  Rienner, 1992),  pp. 113-136;
for a n.ore  detailed  treatments, see Harold Alderman  The Effects  of Food Price and Income Changes  on
the Acquistion  of  Food by Low-Income Households  (Washington, D.C.:  International Food Policy
Research  Institute, 1986).11
Tailoring Solution  to Problem. Food typically  comprises  the largest share of the
consumption  basket, accounting  for over half of it for the poor in most cases.-'  Food price
subsidies, therefore, may be an attractive  ways of keeping  total living costs down.
Table 2: Incidence  of General  Food Subsidies
Percent  of Subsidy  Benefits  Accruing  to Quintile
Country  Commodity  Year  Poorest  2  3  4  Richest
Brazil (Metro area  Rice  1974  19a  66b  15  |
of Belo Horizante)  Wheat  15  62b  23c
Jamaica  Powdered  1988  14  20  20  21  26
Milk, Wheat,  l
_  ~~~~~Corrnmeal______l




* those with incomes <  Cr$ 11,299  (18.4 percent of population)
b  those with incomes >  Cr$ 11,299  and <  Cr$45,200 (62.6 percent of population)
l those with incomes >  Cr$ 45,200 (19.0 percent of population)
d those with incomes <  1.5 minimum  salaries (33.7 percent of population)
l  those with incomes >  1.5 minimum  salaries (66.3 percent of population)
Sources:
Brazil: Calculated  using Calegar and Schuh, "Brazilian  Wheat Policy", Table 28, pg.
53, for the population weights, and Tables 11 and 13, pg. 37 and pg. 39 for annual
per capita subsidies.
Jamaica: Statistical  Institute  of Jamaica  and World Bank "Living Conditions  Survey"
pg. 62.
Mexico: Incidence  figures are taken from World Bank data.
Food Stamps Programs
Currently Jamaica, Venezuela,  Honduras  and Mexico are operating food stamp
programs.,  In  the  first three  cases, the coupons are denominated in  currency and are
'World  Bank World Development  Report 1990  pg. 36.
'For  information on Jamaica's program see Margaret E.  Grosh "The Jamaican Food Stamps
Programme" Food Policy Vol. 17, No. 1, (February 1992), pp. 23-40.  For Venezuela,  see  Haydee
Garcia and Alberto Levy, "Venezuela:  Beca Alimentaria," in Margaret E. Grosh, From Platitudes  to
Practice.-  Targeting  Social Programs in Latin America  (World Bank Report No. 10720-LAC, 1992)
Volume 11, Annex XXI.  For Henduras, information comes from personal involvement  in project12
redeemable  irl  many  p.rticipating commercial  outlets  with little attempt  being  made to ensure that
they are used for any particular items. In Mexico, the Tortivale program benefit is a specified
weight of tortillas, and must be taken in only that form.
The income transfer has generally provided a transfer to recipients of a few
percent of their consumption  bundles on an ongoing basis.  The scale of programs has varied,
but for the largest programs, probably  reaches  on the order of a third to half of poor households.
Where  the collateral  benefits  are obtained,  the increase  in preventive  health services  or enrollment
should foment human capital formation and labor productivity  in the households  that did not
previously  use those services.
Administrative  Feasibility.  The administrative  burden of food stamps can be
thought of in three parts.  The first is the selection  of beneficiaries. This may be relatively
complicated,  for example, when means tests are used in each household as is the case in the
Mexican  Tortivales,  the Honduran  Bono Madre  Jefe de Familia (BMJF)  and the Family  Plan part
of Jamaica's food stamp scheme.  Or it can be much simpler, with benefits going to all those
using a designated  social service as is the case in the Honduran Bono Matcrno-Infantil  (BMI),
the Venezuelan  Beca Alimentaria  and the maternal-child  categories  of the Jamaican  food stamp
program.  The means tests require more sophisticated  administrative  capacity, although the
administrative  burden on the schools or clinics, even in the simple programs, of food stamp
paperwork and of additional  clients should not be underestimated.
The  second major  task  is  distributing the  food  stamps.  The  logistical
requirements  of regularly handing  out stamps to tens or hundreds of thousands  of beneficiaries
are not inconsiderable. Performance  has generally  been acceptable,  but there is apparently  room
for improvement. The Mexican  Tortivale  program has avoided  the need for montily distribution
of food stamps by providing  members  with reusable  plastic cards that certify them as eligible  for
one kilo of tortillas daily from designated  tortilla shops.
Food stamps do not require the public sector to haul and store food commodities
as do many  otherwise  similar food supplement  programs. The savings  in transport  costs and food
wastage  can be considerable. In Colombia,  the administrative  costs of the food coupon  program
were estimated  to be 25 percent, whereas  for a parallel  food .ommodity  distribution  program  they
were 70 percent. 2"
Finally, food stamp  programs require a reclamation  process. Commercial  stores
must be recruited to receive focJ stamps in payment for purchases, and instructed as to how to
convert the food stamps into cash.  In all the countries that use food stamps, this has gone
smoothly  and is -egarded  as a much  smaller logistical  problem  than the selection  of beneficiaries
or the distribution  of stamps.
Political Feasibility.  More concerns seem to be expressed about the political
feasibility  of food stamp  programs than for many other poverty  programs.  Two objections are
missions. For Mexico, see Judy L. Baker, "Mexico:  The Tortivales Program," in Margaret E. Grosh,
From Platitudes  to Prartice.-  Targeting Social Prograrns  in Latin America (World Bank Report No.
10720-LAC,  1992)  Volume II, Annex XVII.
27From Tomas Uribe "Food Coupons in Colombia:  Origins, Current Situation, Replicability  and
Prospects" World Bank, Health and Nutrition  Division, October 1980, pg. 22.13
expressed.  First, Latin Americans  often brand food stamps as asistencialista.28  Food stamps
are seen as creating dependence  on the state by the recipients rather than as empowering  the
recipient  to do without  the state's support. As this critic sm is equally applicabie  to many other
safety net programs, why food stamps in particular receive so much criticism in this vein is
somewhat  unclear.
A second concern, usually voiced by international agency staff, is that well
targeted  food stamps programs  may have too small a political constituency  to maintain  their share
of budget. The Colombian  and Sri Lankan food stamps schemes  are cited as examples  of this.'
This analysis  is somewhat  simplistic  as it fails to take into account the opportunities  that govern-
ments have to build supporting coalitions  and to make choices in program design and publicity
in order to  build support.30 At any rate, to the extent that 'ine targeting limits budgetary
support,  this would affect  not only food stamps  but also other equally  well  targeted  programs  with
other forms of benefits.
Collateral Effects. Food stamp programs can have significant  collateral  benefits
in the form of increasing the coverage of basic social services.  The extent of the collateral
benefits depends on the  initial coverage levels and the design of the programs. The contrast in
the design of the Honduran, Jamaican  and Mexican  program and their results is illustrative.
In Honduras,  the BMI program provides food coupons  worth US$3.70 monthly
to pregnant and lactating women and children under age five who use preventive care in
participating  public  primary health centers. The participants  register for the program  and receive
the food stamps at the health clinics.  In order to maintain eligibility,  they must show they are
using a minimum  of preventive  health services -- growth monitoring and immunization  for the
children and pre- and post-natal care for the women.  During the program's pilot phase, the
number  of such visits to the participating  health centers increased markedly  over previous years
(see Table Ji).
In Jamaica,  the maternal-child  portion of the food stamp  program is supposed  to
work in a broadly similar way.  There have, however, been problems in implementation. The
health care workers  have not provided  the main labor inputs in the clinics. Rather officers  from
the Ministry of Labour, Welfare  and Sport have visited clinics  on a rotating basis for a few days
each month to carry out registrations. The delivery of food stamps sometimes  takes place in the
clinic but frequently it does not and, in any case, it usually occurs when the clinic's health
services are closed. This means that the participant  does not get both the food stamp and health
care for a single investment in travel and waiting time.  Thus little increase in the use of
preventive  care could be expected. Indeed, the pattern of health care use changed  little after the
Wlhis assertion is based on numerous conversations  throughout  the years with government  officials
from many countries.
'World Bank World Development  Report 1990 (Oxford  University  Press, 1990)  pg. 92 and Harold
Alderman  "Food Subsidies  and the Poor" in George  Psacharopoulos,  ed. Essays  on Poverty. Equity. and
Growth (Oxford: Pergamon  Press, 1991)  pp. 172-202.
30For  a fuller discussion  of why these examples  are simplistic,  see Grosh "Platitudes  to Practice" pp.
11-13.14
introduction  of the food stamp program  in 1984.3' This  outcome may be acceptable  considering
that Jamaica had excellent coverage of preventive  services before the food stamp program was
introduced.  To  wit, 90 percent of the population lived within 10 miles of a health center
providing free preventive  care by well trained nurses.  Malnutrition  rates were measured  at only
7.4  percent for  children under the age of  three in  a  1985 household nutrition survey. 32
Vaccination  rates were 73 percent for oral polio and 71 for diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus  vaccines
among children 9 to 59 months of age. 33
Table 3: Percentage Increases  in Matemal and Child  Health Activities  in Pilot Health Centers
with the Beginning  of the Honduran  Bono Materno  Infantil
Urban  Rural
Activity  Centers  Centers  Total
Well child check-up  132  171  155
Growth monitoring  137  230  186
Pre-natal, first visit  108  11  46
Pre-natal, follow-up  99  60  79
Post-natal  56  6  34
Total  119  140  131
Source: PRAF
In Mexico, the Tortivale  program has not been linked with health care use in any
way, nor has the Family Plan part of Jamaica's programs.
Targeting. The targeting  of food stamp  programs can be quite good, depending
on the exact criteria used.  In a review of 30 targeted social programs in Latin America, the
Jamaican food stamp program (the only one with incidence  that is well quantified)  rated in the
top half of programs for the share of benefits accruing  to the poorest 40 percent of households. 4
3 "Margaret E. Grosh, Kristin Fox and Maria Jackson "An Observation  on the Bias in Clinic-Based
Estimates  of Malnutrition  Rates" Working Paper 649 (Wasl,ington:  World Bank, April 1991)  Table 5,
panel A, pg 11 shows little change in health care use from 1984 to 1985 or 1986  (as measured by the
percentage  of children making  their first visit to public  clinics before they reached six months of age and
children under three participating  in growth monitoring).
32  D. Ashley and K. Fox "Child  Nutrition  Survey"  Ministry of Health, Kingston  Jamaica, December
1985, Table 30 pg. T-30, using grades II and III on the Gomez scale as the definition  of malnutrition.
33Ashley  and Fox, "Child Nutrition  Survey" Table 51, pg. 5-51.
-'Margaret E.  Grosh, From Platitudes  to Practice. Targeting Social Programs in Latin America,
World Bank Report No. 10720-LAC,  Volume  I, Table 4.2, pg. 36.15
Tailoring Solution  to Problem. Food stamps can increase the purchasing  power
of the poor.  Eligibility  may be contingent  upon low incomes  which allows the working poor to
benefit.  Or .t may be contingent  on the use of preventive  health care by vulnerable  groups so
that the combined health intervention and income transfer protects them from the risk of
malnutrition.
Food Commodity  Distribution
Food commodity  distribution  has long been one of the most common  options for
combatting  poverty. Chile's Programa  Nacional de Alimentacion  Complementaria  (PNAC), for
example, has its roots in 1924. Many of these programs operate through health clinics, giving
food packets to all pregnant  or lactating women and young  children, as in the Chilean PNAC or
Venezuelan  Programa  Alimentario  Materno-Infantil  (PAMI),  to those  meeting  certain  risk criteria,
as in the Dominican Republic's Programa Materno-Infanti.  ,PROMI) or Peru's Programa de
Alimentacion  y Nutricion  para Familias de Alto Riesgo (PANFAR),  or to malnourished  children
only, as in Jamaica's Supplemental  Feeding Program. 35
Many of the logistic and targeting considerations  relevant to food commodity
distribution  programs are parallel  to those concerning  food stamp programs  operated throughi  the
health system. The income transfer will be a few percentage  points of the family's food basket
over an extended period.  Collateral health benefits may accrue subject to the same design
features discussed  for the food stamps programs.
Administrative Feasibility.  The  identification of  beneficiaries is  usually
manageable.  Since these programs are geared to pregnant and lactating women and young
children who come to clinics (either to all or to those who have biomedical  risk factors of the
kind that the health providers are used to assessing)  there is a natural way to identify and screen
beneficiaries.  These programs usually do not try to do the kind of means tests that can be
somewhat  complicated  in the food stamps programs. The transportation  and storage of the food
commodities,  however, can present large and expensive  logistical  problems. Delays and losses
35For information  on the Chilean PNAC see Isabel Vial, Rosa Camhi and Antonio Infante, "Chile:
El Programa de Alimentacion  Complementaria  (PNAC): Evolucioni  y Mecanismos  de Focalizacion," in
Margaret E. Grosh, From Platitudes  to Practice. Targeting  Social Programs  in Latin America, (World
Bank Report No. 10720-LAC, 1992)  Volume  II, Annex V.  For information  on the Venezuelan  PAMI
see Haydee Garcia and Albeito Levy, "Venezuela:  El PAMI," in Margaret E. Grosh, From Platitudes
to Practice. Targeting  Social Programs  in Latin America (World Bank Report No. 10720-LAC,  1992)
Volume II, Annex XXII.  For information  on the Dominican Republic's PROMI see  Judy L. Baker,
"Dominican  Republic: Targe;ing  Maternal-Child  Health Care through PROMI," in Margaret E. Grosh,
From Platitudes to Practice. Targeting Social Programs in Latin America (World Bank Report No.
10720-LAC,  1992)  Volume  II, Annex  XII.  For information  on Peru's PANFAR see  Gustavo  Yamada,
"Peru: The Feeding and Nutrition Program," in Margaret E.  Grosh, From Platitudes to  Practice.
Targeting  Social Programs  i.a  Latin America (World Bank Report No. 10720-LAC,  1992) Volume  11,
Annex XIX. Information  on famaica's  Supplemental  Feeding  Program comes  from personal  involvement
in project missions.16
in deliveries  are common. 6 These problems  can be  worse in remote areas and where terrain
is difficult. Perhaps the cleanest comparison  of the impact  of storage and transport costs is that
cited above  for Colombia  -- otherwise  similar  programs  showed  administrative  costs of 70 percent
for food commodity  distribution  compared  to 25 percent for food stamp  distribution. Musgrove's
study  of many maternal-child  related  food commodity  distribution  programs shows  that food  costs
as a share of total costs range from 10 to  100 percent, with the median at 71 percent.  The
remainder  consists  of administrative  costs, transportation  costs and, in some cases, the non-food
benefits  of the programs."
Political  Feasibility. 33  Food commodity  distribution  programs seem to be more
politically  acceptable  than food stamp programs. This may be due to the more uniform  link to
the health care system, the maternal-child  orientation  of the programs or the view that food
rations are more likely to be used in worthy ways than cash. 39
Collateral Effects.  Food distribution  programs operating  through health clinics
can bring about increases in health care use where it had previously  been low, depending  on the
same factors as discussed  above for food stamps programs linked to health care.  In Venezuela,
for example, there are anecdotal reports of increases in  clinic utilization'  similar to those
reported for the Honduran  BMI.
Tarzetin . The incidence  of benefits in food commodity  programs fall in the
same range as for other types of targeted programns,  with 60 to 80 percent of benefits accruing
to the poorest 40 percent of households. 4'  Leakage  will be higher when all comers are eligible,
lower when only those meeting some risk criteria are eligible and lowest when only the
malnourished  qualify.  Coverage  will be determined  by the extent of the coverage of the public
health system and by the eligibility  criteria. Where the public health system does not cover large
segments  of the poor, the food commodity  programs will not be able to reach them either.  The
'Philip  Musgrove, "Feeding  Latin America's Children:  An Analytical  Survey of Food Programs"
Latin America  and Caribbean  Technical  Department  Regional  Studies  Program Report 11, (Washington:
World Bank, November 1991)  pp. 84-86.
"Derivation based on Musgrove, "Feeding  LAC's Children" Table A-14 columns  2 and 3, page 1-
45.
nThis  paragraph is based on numerous conversations  through the years with government officials
from many countries.
39Economists,  of course, contend  that whether received  in food itself, in food stamps or in cash, so
long as the value of the transfer is less than would have been spent on food, the transfer's effect on
overall food purchases will be identical, irrespective  of the form in which it is given.  If the household
is given a kilo of powdered milk or of tortillas, it will implicitly  save the price of those commodities
which it would otherwise  have purchased. Thus the money  saved can be used as flexibly  as could  a cash
transfer.  It may partly be spent on extra food, but some will also be spent on raising  the level of non-
food consumption.
'Haydee Garcia, conversation, April 23, Alajuela, Costa Rica.
4'Grosh, "Platitudes  to Practice" Figure 4.8 pg 47.17
lure  of the food can increase  the use of services where they are physically  accessible,  but where
there are no services, there can be no food supplement  program.
Tailoring Solution  to Problem. The programs are tailored  to situations  where  the
combination  of poverty, low use of preventive health services and ignorance of good health
practices  causes malnutrition  anu illness  among  those who are most biologically  vulnerable. The
food commodity  helps to supplement  income, and the tie to preventive  health services and health
education  helps to achieve  the synergy of benefits necessary  to reduce malnutrition  effectively.
School Feeding
School feeding programs have long been very popular.  Every country with a
population  of more than I million in Latin America and the Caribbean  Region has them, though
not always on a large scale.' 2 Indeed, the reason that they do not frequently  crop up as a safety
net idea may be partly because they are already so prevalent.  Of course there is scope for
expanding  their coverage or increasing the food rationis  delivered.  Typically, school feeding
provides a small indirect income transfer. The form -f the transfer is such that in the neediest
families  it may improve  their children's school attendance  and/or learning.
Administrative  Feasibility. Since so many school systems of widely divergent
degrees of sophistication  have school feeding  programs, they are clearly broadly feasible.
Political feasibilit.'3 The political feasibility of school feeding programs is
excellent.  Politicians, the community  at large and beneficiary  households all think that school
feeding is a good thing.
Collateral Effects.  School feeding program. have at least the potential for
producing collateral education  benefits. These can come from helping to improve attendance.
The effect is produced by lowering the real costs of schooling  or providing an in-kind income
transfer." School feeding  programs can also help to improve  learning. Hungry children are less
attentive. Feeding children before or early in the school shift (which may mean a breakfast  or
snack rather than lunch) can help to increase attention  and learning. 45 School feeding  programs
are not likely to have large impacts  on child nutrition. The children  are past the age when they
are most vulnerable, the amount of calories and days per year of feeding are small and the
children are likely to receive less food at home if they are fed at school.6
" 2See Musgrove, Feeding Latin America's Children, Table A-14, pg 1-45.
43This  paragraph is based on numerous conversations  throughout  the years with government  officials
from many countries.
'Beryl  Levinger "School Feeding Programmes: Myth and Potential"  Prospects, Vol XIV, NO. 3,
(1984) pp. 369-376.
'Marlaine E. Lockheed  and Adrian Verspoor  Improving  Primary  Education  in Developing  Countries
(Oxford University  Press, 1991) pg. 75.
'Dean  T. Jamison and Joanne Leslie "Health and Nutrition Considerations  in Education  Planning"
report prepared for UNESCO and the United Nations Administrative  Committee on Coordination  --
Subcommittee  on Nutrition, February 1990, pg. 26.18
Targeting. School lunch programs in some countries, for example Costa Rica,
include all students rather than focusing  only on the needy.' 7 Others, such as those in Jamaica,
are provided to schools in poor areas.'  In Chile, both poor schools and the poorest students
in the schools are targeted." 9 In Costa Rica, 62 percent of the lunches are served to children
from  the poorest households while in Jamaica, the figure is 72 percent and  in Chile, 79
percent.50 In countries  with less than full enrollment,  school lunches  are not a good vehicle for
reaching the very poorest, as they are the children least likely to be in school. 5'
Tailoring  Solution  to Problem. School  feeding  programs provide  in-kind  income
transfers and can be targeted  to schools in poor areas. Also, since one possible  survival  strategy
for households  is to take children  out of school and increase  their labor activities, as is apparently
happening in Peru 52,  new or  expanded school feeding programs may help to  counter that
incentive  and to keep the children in school.
Social Funds'
Social Funds have become quite popular in Latin America since Bolivia first
developed the Emergency Social Fund (ESF) in 1986.  By a Social Fund, I mean a demand
driven institution  set up to finance many  small development  projects. The projects are proposed,
carried out and supervised by other agencies, which are usually a mix of non-governmental
organizations, municipalities and the local offices of national or  regional agencies.  To be
"'All schools participate in the program, and it is only since 1990  that there has been an attempt  to
differentiate  the subsidy  levels so that poor schools receive  higher per lunch subsidies. See Juan Diego
Trejos, "Costa Rica: Los Comedores  Escolares," in Margaret E. Grosh, From Platitudes  to Practice.
Targeting  Social Programs in Latin America (World Bank Report No. 10720-LAC, 1992) Volume  II,
Annex VII.
'See  Judy L. Baker, "Jamaica:  The Nutribun  and School Feeding  Program," in Margaret  E. Grosh,
From Platitudes to Practice.-  Targeting Social Programs in Latin America (World Bank Report No.
10720-LAC,  1992) Volume  II, Annex XIV.
49  See Isabel Vial, Rosa Camhi and  Antonio Infante,  "Chile: Experiencias y  Dilemas en  la
Focalizacion  del Programa  de Alimentacion  Escolar (PAE)  ," in Margaret E. Grosh, From Platitudes  to
Practice. Targeting  Social Programs in Latin America, (World Bank Report No. 10720-LAC, 1992)
Volume II, Annex V.
5Grosh, From Platitudes to Practice, Table 4.2, pg 36.
5'Grosh, "Platitudes  to Practice" Table 8.5, pg. 140.
52Enrollment  rates among children age 11 to 20 in the poorest three deciles of Lima's population  fell
from 81 to  76 percent between June/July and November of  1990, apparently partly as a result of
households' trying to cope with the adjustment  program imposed in August of that year.  No similar
decline was shown for middle income youth.  Instituto  Cuanto Aiuste y Economia  Familiar 1985-1990
(Li.a,  Instituto Cuanto, 1991)  Table 43 pg. 90.
53This section is drawn from World Bank project documents  in support of these programs, as well
as from the specifically  cited references.19
financed, a project must use labor-intensive  methods  for any construction  activities. The mix of
projects to be funded usually includes a large share of construction  or rehabilitation  of basic
infrastructure (clinics, schools, small scale water and sanitation, roads) and a smaller share of
social  service provision (personnel  and/or provisions  for clinics, day-care  centers, school feeding
programs, adult education,  etc.).  Microenterprise  projects are sometimes  sponsored  under the
umbrella  of a Social  Fund (Bolivia's  ESF, Honduras). Sometimes  employment  is an explicit  goal
(Bolivia's ESF, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua)  and sometimes  the benefits  of the infrastructure  or
services  provided are listed as the main  goal (Bolivia's  Social  Investment  Fund [SIF], Guatemala,
Guyana).
Very large numbers of people can benefit from the services or infrastructure
produced by a Social Fund.  The benefit per household can be very large, as when water or
sewerage  services  are provided  to a relatively  small number  of households.  In other cases, larger
numbers of households  will  benefit less directly, such as those who  use roads that are being  better
maintained than previously.  The number of workers who receive wage benefits are usually a
very small fraction of the openly unemployed, their jobs are very short lived and their foregone
earnings can be a large share of actual earnings.
Administrative Feasibility.  Social  Funds  themselves  require  excellent
administration, which is usually made possible by waiving the civil service pay scales, inter-
institutional  consultation  and planning procedures  and procurement  policies which are assumed
to bog down the rest of the public administration. The great virtue of Social Funds is that they
can operate in an environment  where the surrounding  actors are less agile.  Indeed, that is one
of their main reasons for existence. When the agencies that might otherwise implement  large
scale  poverty programs are too deficient  to do so, then Social Funds are a way to circumvent  the
problems of generally  low administrative  capacity.
Political Feasibility. Social  Funds can be quite popular with the beneficiaries  of
the projects  and with the workers. Established  agencies  may have cause  either to welcome  Social
Funds or to oppose them.
The popularity  of the Social Funds with the beneficiaries  of their projects stems
largely from their demand-driven  nature and their relatively  streamlined  bureaucratic  procedures.
Rarely  have local groups received  funding  for their projects  in such short turnaround  times. The
popularity  will probably be greatest when  the portfolios  of the Funds are large enough  to reach
large numbers of communities  and when they include a wide range of project activities.
In Bolivia, workers' reactions to being employed by the ESF were generally
positive.  They were grateful for their employment  when jobs were so scarce, although some
complained  of the low pay, lack of job security and lack of training.4
The first factor that will affect the reaction of the established agencies to the
Social Fund is whether they perceive the funds that flow through Social Funds as additional  to
or in substitution  for funds that would have come to themselves. Central ministries especially
may see themselves  as having  lost out as a result of the creation  of the Social Fund. In contrast,
5'Ramiro Molino Rivera and others "Proyecto de Promocion  e Investigacion  del Fondo Social de
Emergencia:  Reporte Final" report prepared for the Emergency  Social Fund (La Paz, Bolivia, 1988),
pp. 18-23.20
the municipalities  or even the individual  school  or health districts may see the Social Fund as a
new and unexpected  source of financing  that is additional  to the old channels.
A second factor is whether  the Social Fund's project sele&don  criteria agree with
those of the established  agencies  and/or were arrived at in concert with them.  Clearly, where
criteria differ, there is room for conflict.  Consuiting  the line agencies when establishing the
project selection  criteria  and allowing  them a short no-objection  period to each project during the
appraisal  process can help to mute their opposition.
Collateral Effects.  Social Funds can claim to address all three prongs of the
overall poverty reduction strategy to  a greater or lesser degree.  If carefully selected, the
infrastructure projects should encourage economic growth.  The rural  road  rehabilitation
activities, for example,  should improve  market access and the returns to agricultural  activities in
remote regions.  The rehabilitation  of the schools and clinics and the social service provision
projects should contribute  to the provision  of social services  to the poor.  The provision  of work
and labor income to the unemployed  is the main safety net contribution,  although some of the
nutrition projects also contribute  through the income transfer element of the fr,od commodities
that are distributed.
However,  Social  Funds may  produce  fewer of these  collateral  benefits  than would
successful  investments  of equal amounts  of money  directly in infrastructure  or sc  rvice  provision.
For example, their project selection criteria may be less rigorous than those of the sectoral
ministries or may include factors (such as labor content or poverty targeting criteria) that run
counter to getting the highest investment  return.  Social Funds that operate with an emergency
mandate and a  view to  maximizing the quantity rather than the quality of investment are
especially  likely to have this problem.
How much of a contribution  the projects make to improving infrastructure  and
service provision is difficult  to assess.  The individual  projects are very small and because  they
are demand driven, they often look like a patchwork rather than a coherent tranche of an
infrastructure  development  plan. Nonetheless,  in some countries,  the overall scope of investment
can be significant. In Bolivia, the total investment  channeled  through the ESF in 1989  was  equal
to about one third of the public investment  executed  through traditional channtis. 55 In Hondu-
ras, the scale has been a bit smaller, but the FHIS has funded projects in every municipio'.
It has repaired about 10 percent of health posts nationwide,  and is estimated  to be able to build
about five times as many classrooms  each year as the Ministry of Education.
Targeting. Wage benefits  to workers in Social Funds are self-targeted,  in that
unskilled, physically demanding work is offered at the market wage, which tends to be low.
Only the poor are expected  to be willing  to accept such work.  In some Social Funds, poverty
maps are used to help target projects. For example  in Honduras  and Guatemala,  the size of each
municipio's allotment of funds depends upon its poverty  index.  In most of the Social Fund
projects, the project type is also used as a targeting technique. The menu of activities  sponsored
is also supposed  to help to avoid leakage  to the non-poor. For example, community  water taps
" 5 Margaret  E.  Grosh "How Well Did the ESF Work:  A Review of Its Evaluations" in Steen
Jorgensen, Margaret Grosh, and Mark Schacter Bolivia's Answer to Noverty. Economic Crisis and
Adjustment: The Emergency  Social Fund (Washington:  World Bank, 1992), pg. 47.
5 A municipio corresponds  approximately  to a county in the U.S. nomenclature.21
and latrines are cilikely to appeal to well-off communities  that have indoor plumbing  in each
household.
A full evaluation of the targeting of Social Funds should include both the
targeting of the wage benefits to workers and of the flow of benefits from the projects that are
implemented. To date, little evidence exists on either point except for a study of workers in
urban projects funded  by the Bolivian  ESF and a very small survey  of project beneficiaries  of the
Honduran FHIS, plus studies of the geographic  targeting  of each program.
In Bolivia, simulations  were done of the likely earnings  of workers  on urban ESF
projects had they not worked for the ESF compared to how much they probably made while
working for the ESF. These  showed  that 76 percent  of ESF workers would  have belonged  to the
poorest 40 percent of the economically  active  urban population  w'idout  their ESF  jobs.  With the
jobs, only 15 percent fell in this range.5'
One piece of evidence exists from the Honduran FHIS regarding the income
levels of the beneficiaries  of the infrastructure  projects  after they were completed.  A small survey
was done of 92 households  served by 18 social infrastructure  projects.  All the households  that
benefitted  from the projects had income  levels below  the poverty  line used by the Inter-American
Development Bank."  While this survey is too small to  be conclusive, this first piece of
evidence  on the subject suggests  that indeed  targeting  by project type may work.
Targeting  by geographic  areas seems to have been less favorable in both Bolivia
and Honduras." 9 In Bolivia, richer areas received markedly more funding than poorer areas.
In Honduras, the funding  pattern is less clear.  Bodt assessments  are inexact, however, because
they cannot assess to what extent the projects in the richer cities actually benefit  only the poorer
households  therein.
Tailoring  Solution  to Problem. The employment  provided by the Social Fund
projects  is largely full-time  and temporary. Individual  projects  last for only a few months. Much
of the work is done on even shorter daily or weekly contracts.  The construction works are
contracted  out to private sector contractors  who are accountable  for the quality and cost of the
infrastructure investment, but who have complete liberty to  hire whomever they chose as
workers.  The workers are, therefore, presumably chosen on the basis of their output and
reliability. The result is that many have come from the construction  trades.'  In general, the
workers are young male heads of households.
Thus, how well Social Funds meet the needs of the right individuals  depends
partly on the country  and the way the goals have been expressed. In general, Social Funds will
"John L. Newman and others, "How Did Workers Benefit?"  pg. 61.
5 "Sergio Vargas-Olea  "Evaluacion  Ex-Post de Proyectos Financiados  por el Fondo Hondureno de
Inversion Social" report to the Interamerican  Development  Bank (Washington,  January 1992), Table 2
and pg. 4.
'See  Grosh, "How Well Did the ESF Work?"  Table 3.4  pg. 42 and World  Bank Report No. 10291
Table 2, pg.8.
'Newman,  Jorgensen, and Pradhan, "How Did Workers Benefit?"  pg. 62.22
not be able to reach specifically  deflned groups such as those laid off from public enterprises  or
those hurt most by structural adjustment  policies.  Instead they tend to help a subset of the
geneial and chronically  poor and underemployed.
Microenterprise  Credit
The  "best practice" microenterprise credit programs have several common
characteristics. They offer small initial  amounts  of credit, with subsequent  loans being  contingent
on a good repayment  record. T'hey  charge market interest rates.  They use group lending with
community  guarantees  rather than formal  collateral. They have flexible  repayment  schedules  and
excellent repayment  rates.  They start on a very small scale and grow gradually, which allows
for some learning by doing on the part of the agency and the community. It also ensures that
supervision  and training activities  can keep pace with the lending activities. 6'
Microenterprise  credit organizations  in 9 Latin American countries  are affiliates
of  ACCION, a  non-profit organization that  encourages the  creation of  solidarity group
microenterprise credit schemes.'  A number of other countries have other kinds of credit
schemes.'  Many of these are tiny.  In a review  of 17 programs in operation in the mid-1980s,
the largest had about 15,000  beneficiaries  and most had fewer than 10,000. The size of loan that
they offered was also very small, with the largest sums loaned ranging from US$140 to
US$10,000. 64
Administrative  Feasibility. ACCION  atLiliate  programs that had been operating
for at least two years were able to cover  at least half of their operating costs (exclusive  of start-up
capital),and  some programs did even bettcr.'  How far and fast these programs can expand  is
unclear.  In general, the scope seems very limited, although  Bolivia's PRODEM  lent more than
US$9  million in its first three and a half years of renewed  activity  after the economic  crisis there.
Its repayment  rate never fell below 99 percent during that time.'  Bangladesh's  Grameen Bank
6 "Helena Ribe and Sharon L. Holt "Developing  Financial Institutions  for the Poor and Reducing
Barrie:s to Access  for Women"  Discussion  Paper 117 (Washington:  World Bank, 1991)  and Maria Otero
"Solidarity  Group  Programs: A Working  Methodology  for Enhancing  the Economic  Activities  of Women
in the Informal Sector" in Marguerite Berger and Mayra Buvinic  eds. Women's Ventures: Assistance
lo the Informal Sector in Latin America (West Hartford, Connecticut:  Kumarian  Press, 1989), pp. 83-
101.
62Otero, "Solidarity  Group Programs" pg. 84.
'Margaret  Lycette and Karen White "Improving  Women's Access to Credit in Latin America and
the Caribbean: Policy and Project Recommendations"  in Marguerite Berger and Mayra Buvinic eds.
Women's Ventures: Assistance  to the Informal Sector in Latin America (West  Hartford, Connecticut:
Kumarian  Press, 1989), pg. 36.
64Lycette  and White, "Improving  Women's Access  to Credit"
'Otero,  "Solidarity  Group Programs" pg. 94.
'Ribe  and Holt, "Developing  Financial Institutions"  pg. 27.23
with 800,000 beneficial.es and Indonesia's Badan Kredit Kecamatan (BKK) with 2.7 million
beneficiaries  indicate  that larger scale operations  ought to be possible. 6'
Political flkasibility.  Microenterprise  credit is generally  very popular in Latin
America.  It is easy to sell on the basis thaL  it "provides fishhouks to fishermen", thereby
achieving  perrianent increases  in the well-being  and independence  of the participants. Issues of
dependency  o, reliance on charity are seldom raised.
Coll. eral  Effects.  Microenterprise credit  schemes  support the  growth
component  of the overall poverty strategy. A series of very small studies (usually  of fewer than
100  participants)  has shown that microenterprise  credit schemes  have helped to raise participants
incomes from 5 to 75 percent. However, they have been less effective in increasing  the number
of jobs that are available in each enterprise.69
Targeting. In the "best practice" microenterprise  credit schemes, the targeting
can be excellent. A survey of eight solidarity  group programs in Colombia shows that program
beneficiaries came from the poorest quintile of the economically  active population in urban
areas.7
_X1iU!ghi.LSolution  to  'roblem.  These projects are well suited to meeting the
problems that prevail in most Latin American  economies. The informal sector which is where
the clients of these sen,'mes  are concentrated,  contains  many of the poor in the first place.  But
it is also the place wnere those who have lost jobs in the formal economy  may first turn to look
for opportunities.
IV.  Applications
Let us look now at the choices  of program made by two countries -- by Bolivia
in  1986 and by Jamaica in  1988.7' By applying the proposed program choice criteria to the
decision making  process that each of these countries went through, I hope to be ab;e to provide
67Ribe  and Holt, "Developing  Financial  Institutions"  Table 5, pg.22.
61This  paragraph is based on numerous conversations  through the years with government officials
from many countries.
69Otero  "Solidarity  Group Programs", pp. 96-97.
'Otero,  "Solidarity Group Programs' pg. 89
"I was part of the Bank social sectors team that helped to formulate  and supervise  the World Bank
loans made in support of these programs (loans BO-1829,  BO-1332,  BO-2127  in support of the Bolivian
Social Funds and JM-3111 in support of Jamaica's Human Resource Development  P,ogram).  This
section is based on i.iy recollections  and interpretations  of extensive  contact  with governmenz  officials  and
the World Bailk team from September 1986  through May 1991  in the case of Bolivia and from January
1988 to the present in the case of Jamaica. Due to the interpretive  nature of the "stories" I tell here. it
is difficult to supply references in the same degree of detail as in the objective review sections of the
paper.  Of course, references are provided wherever  possible.24
an example of how to take into account specific country circumstances  in weighing program
options and to assess the criteria's validity in practice.  Of course, this test of the criteria will
only wo.:  if the programs chosen were good ones.  Both the Bolivian and Jamaican  programs
have been featured in  numerous World Bank fora as good examples of poverty reduction
programs'  and both programs were continued  by governments  of the opposition  party.  So the
assessment  that they are good programs is widely  shared. As it turns out, the proposed  program
choice criteria do point toward the choices made.
Bolivia's Choices in 1986
In the mid-1980s, Bolivia was just emerging from a prolonged and drastic
economic  crisis. Hyperinflation  was running at about 24,000 percent, GDP per capita  had fallen
by over 20 percent since 1980, the public sector deficit was running at about a quarter of GDP
and the economy  was breaking  down. In 1985,  draconian stabilization  and adjustment  measures
were put in place.'  Inflation was quickly brought to a near standstill, but growth took much
longer  to reestablish. Bolivia  had always been  one of the poorer countries  in the hemisphere,  but
the deterioration  of the economy  and of the public sector's ability to deliver social services  left
the poor even worse off than they had been previously. 7'  The gross primary school enrollment
rate was 87 percent, infant mortality  was 111 per thousand live births, and only about a quarter
of one year old children were fully immunized  for polio and diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus. 75
In 1986, the Bolivian  government  had tamed inflation  and it began  to look at the
next set of problems. In particular, it wanted  to do something  about  poverty for reasons both of
real humanitarianism  and of pragmatic politics.  The poor had  suffered from the years of
economic  decline and there was limited  social tolerance  for years of waiting for sector reforms
to bear fruit. The government  wanted  an anti-poverty  program  that would  be effective  and visible
and that would have an immediate  impact. 76
The government  rvoceeded  to investigate  the suitability  of - number  of different
programs to the circumstances  and problems that Bolivia was then facing. Let us now see how
relevant each of our criteria were in this process of evaluating  each of the programs.
First, the elimination  of general food price subsidies was among  the sweeping
adjustment  reforms that aimed to eliminate  distortions in the economy.  Thus rather than be
'2See, for example,  World  Bank Poverty Reduction  Handbook  (Washington:  World Bank, 1992)  Box
6.7, pg. 6-8 and Box A7.30, pg. A7-31.
'Mark  Schacter, Margaret Grosh, Steen Jorgensen "What, Why, How? A Primer on the ESF" in
Jorgensen, Grosh and Schacter, pp. 2-3.
7'Schacter,  Grosh, and Jorgensen "A Primer on the ESF" pg. 3.
"5UNICEF  The State  of the World's Children 1989  (Oxford  University  Press, 1989)  Table 4, pg. 100;
Table 1, pg. 94; and Table 3, pg. 98.
76Katherine  Marshall "'The  Genesis  and Early Debates"  in Jorgensen, Grosh and Schacter, pg. 25.25
considered  among the options for a poverty  alleviation  scheme, their elimination  was part of the
prompting  to have some other kind of anti-poverty  program."
The government  considered  a food commodity  distribution  scheme but, in the
end, rejected the idea."  In the first place, the scheme would have depended on international
food donations  which were deemed to discourage  local production. Thus, rather than collateral
benefits, the scheme was thought to have collateral costs. It was also decided that there was
ii.sufficient  administrative  capacity  to carry out food commodity  distribution  programs  uniformly
throughout  the country, although  several  non-governmental  organizations  had programs that were
important  in some regions.  It was also seen as politically  undesirable  as the hand-out  approach
was regarded as paternalistic  and counter to the spirit of the adjustment  program. Finally, there
was some discomfort  with the targeting  of existing  food commodity  distribution  programs. While
the criteria were sensible,  there were reports of very poor implementation.
The government  did not consider  introducing  a food stamp program,  probably
because at that time very few them existed in the developing  world. The same concerns  about
inadequate  administrative  capacity  and paternalism  as were expressed in the case of commodity
distribution  would  have applied  to food stamps. Furthermore,  in a country  that was  just emerging
from hyperinflation,  the notion of a nominally  denominated  stamp would  have been una tractive
to recipients, and one denominated  in quantities  would have been unattractive  to merchants  due
to the difficulties  of setting a reimbursement  formula with high inflation.
A school lunch program would  have  been  subject  to most of the same objections
as were raised against a food c)mmodity distribution  program. While it might have had some
collateral benefits for  education, it would have relied on  food aid  which was deemed a
disincentive  to local production. The transport and management  logistics would have been as
administratively  complex as those for food commodity  distribution. It would also have had the
same paternalistic touch that the government sought to avoid.  Finally, the targeting would
probably  have been mediocre at best. The poorest families  were the least likely to have children
in school and the poorest communities  were the least like;y to have the administrative  capacity
to implement  such a program.
Some attention was given to the possibility  of introducing  a  microenterprise
credit scheme.  The collateral  effects would have been attractive  as successful  microenterprise
credit can help to foster growth of incomes  and sometimes  employment  in the poor segments  of
society. Also, this seemed  to be an appropriate  solution  to Bolivia's particular  poverty problem.
Few of the poor had been  able to protect  their financial  assets  from the drastic inflation,  and thus,
small enterprises had been decapitalized. However, there was a great deal of public suspicion
about the idea which threatened its political sustainability.  This was due to Bolivia's history of
large-scale,  government  subsidized  credit schemes  with very poor repayment  records, which had
left the state with large uncollectible  debts from loans which had mostly benefitted  the rich and
well-connected.  But  the  main  reason  why  the  government finally  decided  against a
microenterprise  credit scheme  was that it would not be administratively  feasible  on the extensive
scale that would be required for both visibility  and impact (though the Emergency  Social Fund
'Marshall  "The Genesis and Early Debates" pg. 29.
"Steen Jorgensen "Who Needs an ESF?" in  S+een  Jorgensen, Margaret Grosh, and Mark Schacter
Bolivia's  Answer  to  Poverty.  Economic Crisis and  Adjustment:  The  Emergencv Social Fund
(Washington:  World Bank, 1992), pg. 112.26
that was eventually chosen did devote 4 percent of its funds to cooperatives  and small credit
projects).
Eventually,  the Bolivian  government  chose a Social Fund (the  Ei  -rgency  Social
Fund or ESF) which became  the centerpiece  of all of its poverty programs. As a complimentary
strategy, the level of financing  for the Ministry  of Health was increased  to approximately  its pre-
crisis level,'  while at the same time, the government  initiated major, internationally  financed
projects first in health and later in education.'
The idea of a Social Fund fit all of the project selection  criteria proposed here
fairly well. Its administrative  feasibility was much enhanced by being granted the necessary
exceptions  to civil service pay, planning  and procurement  rules.  In consequence,  its record shone
especially brightly in contrast to the broken down public agencies with a mandate in the same
sectors.
Also, the political feasibility  of a Fund that provided funds for locally inspired
projects was good. It  pleased recipient communities and workers, and, since many of the
executing agencies were local governments  of the opposition party, support for the coalition
government was fostered.  Although there was initial resistance from other institutions,  it was
overcome through the concerted  efforts of the ESF management.
On targeting  criteria, the ESF set itself easily achievable  standards for reaching
the poor, but was not concerned  with confining  itself to reaching only the poorest of the poor.
One of the common refrains of the time was that poverty was so widespread  in Bolivia  that the
ESF was 'playing with an infinite  dartboard. Wherever  it threw a dart [in other words, financed
a project] it came up with a winner [in other words, it served the poor]".  It had clear collateral
benefits in that it rehabilitated  or expanded  the country's insufficient  infrastructure  and social
service provision.
The ESF was tailored  to Bolivia's  specific  problems  in that it provided  jobs which
helped to ameliorate  the unemployment  increases  and seemed a suitable short term employment
alternative for the politically powerful miners who were laid off en  masse as part of the
adjustment  measures."
A further advantage  of the ESF was that, since it served as a financing agency
for small projects in a very diverse portfolio, it could finance  some of the other interventions  on
a smaller, more  manageable  scale. Indeed, it funded  food commodity  distribution,  school  lunches
and the rehabilitation  of the basic infrastructure  in health and education, and it contributed  a
0'Margaret  E. Grosh "Social  Spending  in Latin America: The Story of the 1980s" Discussion  Paper
106 (Washington,  World Bank, 1990)  Table A.IV.  1 pg. 97.
'For  example the World Bank's credit in support of health (BO-8001)  was approved in December
1989. Its credit in support of education  was identified  in 1990  and is scheduled  form appraisal in 1993.
SI  Subsequently,  it turned out that miners comprised  a small part of the workers hired and that only
a small proportion of miners worked for the ESF.  John L.  Newman, Steen Jorgensen and Menno
Pradhan, "How Did Workers Benefit?"  in Steen Jorgensen, Margaret Grosh, and Mark Schacter eds.,
Bolivia's Answer  to  Poverty.  Economic Crisis and  Adjustment:  The  Emergency Social Fund
(Washington:  World Bank, 1992), pg. 57.27
major part of the recapitalization  of the most successful of the NGOs' microenterprise  credit
projects.
Table 4: Summary  of Country Applications
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Jamaica's  Choices in 1988
In 1988, Jamaica faced a situation similar to, if less acute than, Bolivia's two
years earlier.  GDP per capita had declined  by 20 percent between 1972  and 1987. The social
sectors had suffered funding  cutbacks  over several years with real current expenditures  in health
and education  32 percent lower in 1985/86  than in 1982/83.'  The situation was, however, less
drastic than had been the case in Bolivia. Inflation  had peaked  at 28 percent in 1984. And prior
to the funding cutbacks,  Jamaica  had achieved  excellent coverage  and good quality in most of its
social  service delivery. The gross primary enrollment  rate was 107  percent, infant  mortality  was
18 per thousand live births, and over 80 percent of one year old children were fully immunized
against  polio and diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus.1
The Jamaican  government  went through a similar  process of choosing  among  the
various program options for poverty alleviation  interventions. Consideration  was given to food
stamps, clinic-based  food commodity  distribution, school feeding, and employment  programs.
Once again, our criteria  prove to have had retrospective  relevance  to the  decision  making  process.
Before adjustment,  Jamaica had subsidized  a handful of imported staple foods.
Explicit subsidies  were relatively  small, accounting  for only about 4 percent of the food basket
consumed by  the poorest quintile in  1988", though, as the exchange rate was somewhat
overvalued, the implicit subsidy on a broader range of goods was larger. I  The adjustment
policies for Jamaica  eliminated  explicit subsidies  and liberalized  the exchange rate.  Thus as in
the case of Bolivia, general  food subsidies were not a  candidate for the poverty programs
r  eviewed.
Jamaica already had a large food stamp program' 6 which had been introduced
in  1984 when general food subsidies had been eliminated  in a previous round of adjustment
measures (they had been reinstated  in 1986). The program reached about 400,000 beneficiaries
with a transfer then worth US$1.80 monthly. One half of the program  granted benefits to poor
households  as identified  by a means  test or by the registration  lists for the Poor Relief and Public
Assistance  programs. The other half of the program was for pregnant and lactating  women and
children under five who registered and received  food stamps at public primary health clinics.
This part of the program was self-targeted  in that the stamps were distributed through public
health clinics (which the rich tend not to use) and the time costs  of standing  in line to register and
pick up stamps acted as a disincentive  on the non-poor.
The administrative  feasibility  of the food stamp  program  had already  been  proven.
Although it had its share of  imperfections,  the program was operational.  The food stamp
"Margaret Grosh "Social  Spending in the Latin America" Table A.IV.  1 and A.IV.2, pg. 97.
'UNICEF The State  of the World's Children 1989  (Oxford  University  Press, 1989)  Table 4, pg. 100;
Table 1, pg. 94; and Table 3, pg. 98.
'4STATIN  and World Bank, Living Conditions  Survey, pg. 62.
' 5Bale, "Agricultural  Trade and Food Policy" pg. 24.
6This program was included in the review in Section 111. The most comprehensive  description is
Grosh, "The Jamaican  Food Stamps Program".29
program  offered the political attraction  that the government  would  be able to announce  that while
the food subsidies were being cut, the value of the food stamps for the purchase of the same
commodities  would be increased  to compensate. However, food stamps do not reach the same
numbers of people as do food subsidies, with the vocal, politically  active middle classes being
the ones most likely to lose out. Although  linking  food sf  imp distribution  to public  health clinics
can sometimes  provide significant  collateral benefits in encouraging  the use of primary health
care, no noticeable collateral  benefit had been achieved in the Jamaican  program at that time.
The targeting  of food stamps was quite good. Also, food stamps were a good way to tackle one
of the key causes of poverty in Jamaica, namely the rise in food prices, especially of the
commodities  that had previously  been subsidized. Thus, there were several  good reasons  for the
government  to consider  expanding  its food stamp program.
Jamaica also had in place a small food commodity  distribution' program  that
gave food packages to families whose children had been identified through the public health
system as showing  signs  of moderate  or severe malnutrition.  The program  was already operating
in the c!inics nationwide, so in that sense, it had expanded  as far as it could. Nevertheless, it
might have been possible to loosen the criteria for the supplemental  feeding  program to include
mildly malnourished  children or all children  as an alternative  to increasing  the value of the food
stamps.
Although  the  small  program  was shown  to be administratively  feasible,  a dramatic
expansion  probably would not have been.  The health service in general was understaffed  and
stretched to  the limit and adding a  major new burden was not  administratively  feasible.
Furthermore, the most problematic  part of the supplemental  feeding  program had been getting
the food commodities  through customs and into the clinics.  The donor agencies had already
agreed to the monetization  of food aid in support of the food stamp program, so the appeal of
expanding  the supplemental  fuod program (thereby multiplying  the food handling problems)  as
opposed to the food stamp program was slight.
Because  the supplemental  feeding  program  was effectively  tied to health care use,
it might have achieved  more collateral  benefits than food stamps.  However, preventive  health
care  coverage was already largely  satisfactory so  there  was  not  much room  for  gain.
Furthermore, the effectiveness  of the link between  supplemental  feeding  and health care depended
to a great extent on the small scale of the program, and this might have been lost if the number
of beneficiaries  had expanded  by tenfold or more.
The targeting  of the supplemental  feeding program with its eligibility  restricted
to only malnourished  children seemed to be excellent. If the criteria had been less restricted, it
would probably  have been  similar to the targeting  achieved  by the food stamp  program. Finally,
expanding the supplemental  feeding program would have been as appropriate a response to
Jamaica's  poverty problems as  the  maternal-child part  of  the  food stamp program, but
supplemental  feeding would not have been able to reach the numbers of the working poor that
the means-tested  part of the food stamp program could.
'7This  program was covered in the review in Section  Ill.30
School lunches' were considered  as part of the safety net.  Administratively,
it seemed feasible to expand the existing programs.  Their political feasibility was excellent.
School lunches  are non-controversial  and valued. The targeting of the lunch programs was not
well quantified  at the time that the government was choosing its anti-poverty  program, but, in
fact, it is as good as that for the food stamps program.'  Moreover, school lunches  are thought
to have had positive education  benefits in Jamaica.  Finally, they addressed the concern about
poverty only in the general sense of providing an indirect income transfer, but they were
appropriate  in that they could reach the working  poor.
The government  considered  implementing  an employment  program,  though not
of the Social Fund variety.  The intention was for it to  operate through the Ministries of
Agriculture and Public works to implement  programs using short term workers.  The projects
would be selected by the ministries rather than being proposed by local groups.  The labor-
intensive  activities that were envisaged  for this program were in areas that, if each project was
carefully  selected and designed, could have had collateral  benefits -- such as reforestation  and
watershed  management,  rural road rehabilitation,  drainage and flood control.
The administrative  feasibility  of the program  was less than certain. The program
proposed was quite large and  would have relied  on  the line agencies for  selecting and
implementing  projects. At the time, the agencies had been suffering from several years of
cutbacks  and some loss of institutional  capacity and were unlikely  to have been able to manage
as large a program as fast as was initially proposed.
The political feasibility  of the program would probably have been quite good.
Employment  provision carries  less stigma  than food stamp  transfers, and the communities  to have
benefitted  from the works would  presumably  have  appreciated  them. Furthermore,  elections  were
approaching  and the laborers could have been expected  to vote for the party that had provided
them with jobs.
The rate of return to the projects will never really be known. Theoretically  they
could have been acceptable  with adequate  selection  criteria and administration,  but since these
were uncertain, so were the rates of return.  Similarly,  how well the program would have been
targeted will never be really known. However, it is likely that the level of wages and the kind
of work to be offered would probably  have caused the program to reach the moderately  poor.
But since most of these were not openly  unemployed,  they would  have foregone  income  possibly
not much less than their earnings on the program would have been.
The appropriateness  of an employment  program  to the problems  faced in Jamaica
was also doubtful. During the years of structural adjustment  the unemployment  rate had fallen
markedly.  Thus, rather being hurt by unemployment,  the poor were hurt by falling real wages
among  those employed.'  This meant that an employment  program  that provided  pan-time work
"This program was also covered in the review in section III, with information  from Baker "The
Nutribun and School Feeding  Program"
' 9STATIN  and World Bank, Living Conditions  Survey, pg. 56 and 67.
'Michael  Witter and Patricia Anderson  "The Distribution  of the Social Cost of Jamaica's Structural
Adjustment 1977-1989"  University  of the West Indies, Consortium  Graduate School and Institute for
Social and Economic Research, May 1991 Chapter IV, pp, 60-94.31
to  large numbers of  employed heads of household or  secondary workers would be  more
appropriate  than one that provided fewer full-time  jobs. Preliminary indications  of this were
already available in 1988.
In the end, Jamaica chose a coordinated  package of initiatives  that came to be
called the Human Resources Development  Program (HRDP). The largest expenditures  were for
the expansion of the food stamps and school feeding programs.  A slot was left open for
employment  programs, but these did not materialize  on a large scale, partly because  international
aid agencies declined to help finance them.  In addition, a number of measures were taken to
improve the quality of basic healuh  and education  services. These included an increase in the
share of government  financing  going to the social  sectors, an increase in the share of social sector
expenditure  going to primary education  and primary  health and some cost recovery  and efficiency
incentives. Schools  and clinics were repaired, pharmaceutical  stocks were refurbished,  training
for teachers and nurses was expanded  and textbooks  were provided.
V.  Discussion
The review  of program experience  in general  and of the stories of choices  among
programs in two specific settings leads to three broad conclusions. First, and perhaps most
obvious, is how little evidence exists on many facets of program impact, particularly on the
magnitude  of externalities  and of behavioral  responses  to program  participation. 9"  Second, there
is a great deal of overlap in the general range of results for different  types of programs. Third,
the magnitude of each element that letermines overall cost-effectiveness  is very sensitive to
details of design and context.
By way of illustration  of these issues,  let us draw together information  on just two
dimensions  of three kinds of programs.  The share of administrative  costs and the incidence  of
the food stamp, food commodity  and school  feeding  programs discussed  in section  III are shown
in Table 5.  The number of empty cells is readily apparent (and would be much  greater of if the
other criteria and program types were included in the table).  Where information  is available,
there are larger differences  between  the highs and lows for different program types than among
the means among  the program types.  For example,  the share of administrative  costs in the food
commodity  programs cited ranges  from 3 to 22 percent  of the total program  budgets. In contrast,
the mean for the share of administrative  costs for these programs is about 9 percent for food
stamps, about I I percent for food commodities  and about 6 percent for school lunches. There
is less diversity  in the incidence,  with all programs  getting from 62 to 80 percent of the program
benefits to households  in the poorest two quintiles  of the population. But again, there is no clear
ranking among programs.
"'I have confined the review here to program analysis  done for Latin American countries. This is
perhaps somewhat  artificial, but in keeping with the focus of the conference  and with my comparative
advantage. A broader review of worldwide  evidence  would probably  not alter the conclusions  reached
here.  Even if it did, there is an argument  that the Latin American examples  cited are more likely to be
relevant  to the design of programs for other Latin American  countries  to the extent that conimonalities
of history, culture, institutions,  development  models,  and the like influence  program  outcomes. Looking
beyond the confines of this paper, this argues for the importance  of good program evaluations  both as
part of program design and on the research agenda  of those concerned  with poverty in Latin America.32
Table 5: Administrative  Costs and Incidence  in Food Stamps, School Lunch
and Food Commodity  Distribution  Programs
Administrative  Percent of Benefits
Costs as a Share of  Accruing  to Poorest
________________________________  Total Budget  40% of Households
Food Stamps  _  l
Jamaica  - Food Stamps Program  10  75
Honduras - BMJF  12  n.a.
BMI  6  n.a.
Mexico  - Tortivales  12  n.a.
Venezuela  - Beca Alimentaria  3  n.a.
School Lunches
Chile  5  79
Costa Rica  n.a.  62
Jamaica  7  72
Food Commodity
Chile - PNAC  6  69
Dominican  Republic - PROMI  12  80
Jamaica  - Supplemental  Feeding  n.a.  n.a.
Peru - PANFAR  22  n.a.
Venezuela  - PAMI  3  n.a.
Source: Grosh "Platitudes  to Practice"  Table 4.2.
The effect of the less well measured  factors is just as difficult  to rank a priori.
The review in Section  III showed  that the extent  of collateral  benefits  in these  programs can range
from none to large.  The degree of political acceptability  also differs with context.  There was
concern that school feeding  was paternalistic  in Bolivia  in 1986,  but not in Jamaica in 1988.  Food
stamps seem somewhat less politically acceptable  than the other programs, but the factor is
intangible  and highly variable between  countries. And of course the suitability  to the need will
vary according to the country and the circumstances  it faces at the time of choosing among
programs.
Comparisons  of Social  Funds  to these  three program  types are further complicated
by the multidimensional  nature of the benefits of Social Funds.  To compare  the wage benefits
from Social Fund employment  projects with transfers from food stamp, food commodity, or
school feeding programs is tempting  but false.  The targeting comparisons  could favor either
program, depending on the country-specific  details.  The direct transfer programs, however,
would have much higher (more favorable)  transfer-to-total  cost ratios than a Social Fund.  The
Social Fund would have basic administrative  costs in the same range as the other programs, but
will have additional  non-transfer  costs in the form of equipment,  materials, and skilled  labor for
the employment  projects. Furthermore,  Social  Funds will have  much  higher costs  of participation
(including the income foregone by Social Fund laborers) than the food stamp or  commodity
programs.  After discounting for these, Social Funds would compare badly indeed if  the33
comparison  is based only on the distribution  of wages. But to evaluate  Social  Fund projects only
on their wage distribution is to ignore the benefit stream from the infrastructure  created or
rehabilitated -- which is always an important, and sometimes the predominant, goal of the
programs.  Unfortunately  we don't yet have good information  on the distribution  or even of the
magnitude  of the benefits from the infrastructure  for most of the Social  Funds.  Even if we did,
the calculation  of how  that might affect  the iocomes  of those who have  access to the infrastructure
is tricky.
In trying to compare  the micro-enterprise  credit programs to the others there are
two problems  -- scale and the different  nature of the benefit. The microenterprise  credit projects
reviewed were only a fraction of the size of the other kinds of projects. Also they provide what
is intended to be a permanent boost in earnings capacity rather than a temporary transfer of
income. Metaphorically  stated, the problem is "is it better to feed a hundred people for one day,
or to give one of them a fishhook?" Adequate  economic  evaluation  of that problem requires a
dynamic framework  with a long time horizon.
The first round comparisons  of general food price subsidies with targeted food
stamp/commodity/school  feeding programs is rather more straightforward. With targeting  and
administrative  costs in the ranges observed, the targeted options may do somewhat better in
simulations of how a given level of expenditure  will change poverty. 92 These comparisons
become more complicated  when the various collateral  effects are calculated,  but perhaps more
dissent is generated by the subjective issues of whether particular targeted options can meet
minimum  levels of administrative  and political feasibility.
Together  the paucity  of information  on outcomes,  the diversity  of outcomes  within
program type according to details of design and context and the similarity of outcomes across
program type preclude this paper from arriving at a fully generalizable  set of simulated  cost-
effectiveness  calculations  or ranking of programs.  Rather, it provides  the following  general
hypotheses or rules of thumb, which can be used in reviewing program options in a specific
country context.
(i) where administratively  and politically  viable, targeted transfer  programs are likely to be more
cost-effective  than general food price subsidies;
(ii) well managed microenterprise  credit schemes  are usually able to reach only a very limited
number of beneficiaries;
(iii) Social Funds must produce a significant  flow of benefits  through the infrastructure  or social
services they provide in order to be competitive  options. As mechanisms  only to transfer income
in the form of wage benefits, they will be less cost-effective  than transfers imbedded in food
stamps, food commodity  distribution  or school lunches;
(iv) food commodity  distribution  programs will always have higher transport and spoilage  costs
than food stamps programs, but have many other characteristics  in common, so there is a mild
prejudice in favor of distributing  food stamps rather than food commodities;
'Judy  Baker and Margaret Grosh "Poverty Reduction  Through Geographic  Targeting:  How Well
Does It Work?"  Living Standard  Measurement  Study  Working  Paper Series No. 98 (Washington,  D.C:
World Bank, forthcoming)  pp. 15-16  provide such a comparison  based on administrative  costs, targeting
outcomes  and transfers for beneficiary. Collateral effects are not considered.34
(v) where income  transfer is the goal, among  food stamps, food commodities,  and school feeding
programs, the details of program design, institutional  capacities and secondary objectives  will
determine the selection among programs that often fall  in the same general range of cost-
effectiveness  with regard to the transfers they provide.
(vi) any of the above  expectations  may be proved false in particular  circumstances,  depending  on
the details of program design and country  context.
This paper has proposed  five criteria for choosing  among program,  signed to
ameliorate  poverty in the short run -- administrative  feasibility, political feasibility, collateral
effects, targeting,  and the tailoring  of the solution  to the problem. It has marshalled  the evidence
available  on how general  food price subsidies,  food stamp  programs, food commodity  distribution
programs, school feeding, Social Funds and micro-enterprise  credit schemes in Latin America
have performed according to these criteria.  When applied to the choice of programs that were
made in Bolivia in 1986  and in Jamaica  in 1988, the five criteria proposed  here did point to the
choices  that were made in each country, choices that were widely  deemed to be successful and
appropriate. Thus, I conclude  that the program choice criteria proposed here are sensible. In
the short term they can help organize  debates about program choice  when full cost-effectiveness
analysis of various options is not to be done.  It is to be hoped that in the medium term our
knowledge  of the magnitude  of the various effects discussed  here will be more extensive  so that
we can have more complete  and robust rules of thumb.  In the long term, it is to be hoped that
we will be able to do rigorous cost-effectiveness  analysis more often and leave aside these rule
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